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Abstract
Recessions are often accompanied by spikes of corporate default and prolonged declines
of business credit. This paper argues that credit and default cycles are the outcomes
of variations in self-fulfilling beliefs about credit market conditions. We develop a
tractable macroeconomic model in which leverage ratios and interest spreads are de-
termined in optimal credit contracts that reflect the expected default risk of borrowing
firms. We calibrate the model to evaluate the impact of sunspots and fundamental
shocks on the credit market and on output dynamics. Self-fulfilling changes in credit
market expectations trigger sizable reactions in default rates and generate endoge-
nously persistent credit and output cycles. All credit market shocks together account
for about 50% of the variation of U.S. output growth during 1982–2015.
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1 Introduction
Many recessions are accompanied by substantial increases of corporate default rates and
credit spreads, together with declines of business credit. On the one hand, corporate defaults
tend to be clustered over prolonged episodes which gives rise to persistent credit cycles (see
e.g. Giesecke et al. (2011)). Such clustering of default can only partly be explained by
observable firm-specific or macroeconomic variables, but is driven by unobserved factors
that are correlated across firms and over time (Duffie et al. (2009)). On the other hand,
credit spreads tend to lead the cycle and are not fully accounted for by expected default.
Moreover, less than half of the volatility of credit spreads can be explained by expected
default losses; instead, it is the “excess premium” on corporate bonds that has the strongest
impact on investment and output (Gilchrist and Zakrajˇsek (2012)).
This paper examines the joint dynamics of firm default, credit spreads and output, using
a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model in which firms issue defaultable debt. We
argue that default rates in such economies are susceptible to self-fulfilling beliefs over credit
conditions. States of low default and good credit conditions can alternate between states
of high default and bad credit conditions. Stochastic variation of self-fulfilling beliefs play
a key role in accounting for the persistent dynamics of default rates and their co-movement
with macroeconomic variables.
To illustrate our main idea, we present in Section 3 a simple partial-equilibrium model of
firm credit with limited commitment and equilibrium default. Leverage and the interest rate
spread depend on the value that borrowing firms attach to future credit market conditions
which critically impacts the firms’ default decisions, and hence is taken into account in the
optimal credit contract. This credit market value is a forward-looking variable which reacts
to self-fulfilling expectations. A well-functioning credit market with a low interest rate and
a low default rate is highly valuable for firms, and this high valuation makes credit contracts
with few defaults self-enforcing. Conversely, a weak credit market with a higher interest rate
and more default is valued less by firms, and therefore it cannot sustain credit contracts that
prevent high default rates.
After this illustrative example, we build in Section 4 a general-equilibrium model in order
to analyze the role of self-fulfilling expectations and fundamental shocks for the dynamics of
default rates, spreads and their relationships with the aggregate economy. Credit constraints,
spreads, default rates, and aggregate productivity are all endogenous outcomes of optimal
debt contracts. As in the simple model, leverage ratios and default rates depend on the value
that borrowers attach to future credit market conditions which is susceptible to changes of
self-fulfilling beliefs. Aggregate productivity is determined by the allocation of capital among
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firms which itself depends on current leverage ratios and on past default events. When credit
is tightened or when more firms opt for default, less capital is operated by the most productive
firms so that aggregate productivity and output fall.
Firms in our model differ in productivity and in their access to the credit market. High-
productivity firms with a good credit standing borrow up to an endogenous credit limit at
an interest rate which partly reflects the expected default loss and which also includes an
excess interest premium. This premium, which may itself be subject to aggregate shocks,
is a shortcut to account for the so-called “credit spread puzzle” according to which actual
credit spreads are larger than expected default losses (e.g., Elton et al. (2001) and Huang
and Huang (2012)). We also allow the recovery rate to fluctuate which affects the expected
default loss and hence takes a direct impact on leverage and on the predicted component of
the credit spread.
If a firm opts for default, a fraction of its assets can be recovered by creditors. After
default, the firm’s owner may continue to operate a business (possibly under a different
name), but she loses the good credit standing and hence remains temporarily excluded from
the credit market. Notice that net worth of firms with credit market access is endogenous,
and aggregate productivity and factor demand depend on the borrowing capacity (net worth
multiplied by the leverage ratio) of firms. Then, periods of high default can have a long-
lasting impact on credit and output. In the next section we use a simple VAR model to show
that shocks to the default rate, which are orthogonal to credit spreads and recovery rates,
have indeed a negative impact on output growth. Modeling the default cycle is therefore
crucial for the overall macroeconomic dynamics.
In Section 5 we calibrate this model and show that it responds to changes in self-fulfilling
beliefs about credit market conditions. These belief changes can be induced by fundamental
shocks to the real or to the financial sector (i.e., shocks to the recovery rate, to the excess
premium, or to aggregate productivity), but they can also be completely unrelated to funda-
mentals (sunspot shocks). We show that variations in self-fulfilling beliefs are crucial for the
dynamics of default rates. An adverse sunspot shock raises the default rate and depresses
leverage. Additionally, sunspots are also tied to shocks to the recovery rate, to the excess
premium, and to aggregate productivity. That is why these fundamental shocks also gen-
erate reactions of default rates. Finally, recovery shocks are important for credit flows and
output growth.
Although different shocks in our model can be called “financial shocks”, the generated
equilibrium responses are significantly different from each other, highlighting the complex
dimensions of financial frictions. Our model links these dimensions in a tractable model
framework, and the model estimation suggests that all three financial shocks together ex-
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plain output dynamics since 1982 rather well and account for about 50% of output growth
volatility, of which about 40% are induced by changes in credit market expectations.
Our work relates to a number of recent contributions analyzing the macroeconomic im-
plications of credit spreads and firm default. Building on Bernanke et al. (1999), Christiano
et al. (2014) introduce risk shocks in a quantitative business-cycle model and show that
these shocks not only generate countercyclical spreads but also account for a large fraction
of macroeconomic fluctuations. Miao and Wang (2010) include long-term defaultable debt
in a macroeconomic model with financial shocks to the recovery rate. In line with empirical
evidence, they find that credit spreads are countercyclical and lead output and stock returns.
Gomes and Schmid (2012) develop a macroeconomic model with endogenous default of het-
erogeneous firms and analyze the dynamics of credit spreads. Gourio (2013) is motivated
by the volatility of the excess bond premium and argues that time-varying risk of rare de-
pressions (disaster risk) can generate plausible volatility of credit spreads and co-movement
with macroeconomic variables. Self-fulfilling expectations do not matter in all these contri-
butions which differ from our model in that default incentives do not depend on expected
credit conditions. Also, these papers do not allow for a link between the credit market and
aggregate factor productivity.1
Our work further builds on a literature on self-fulfilling expectations and multiplicity in
macroeconomic models with financial market imperfections. Most closely related is Azariadis
et al. (2016) who show that sunspot shocks account for the procyclical dynamics of unsecured
credit. As in this paper, equilibrium indeterminacy arises due to a dynamic complementarity
in borrowers’ valuation of credit market access. Harrison and Weder (2013), Benhabib
and Wang (2013), Liu and Wang (2014) and Gu et al. (2013) also show how equilibrium
indeterminacy and endogenous credit cycles arise in credit-constrained economies.
None of these papers addresses default and credit spreads. Notice that default in equi-
librium is important, although the average default rate might be low. This is because equi-
librium default imposes an externality on others who choose not to default: Credit contracts
and the associated leverage ratios reflect these potential default risks. Furthermore, the
variation in default rates in our model is almost entirely caused by variations in self-fulfilling
beliefs. This fact can be used to back out shocks that impact beliefs, and we show that these
shocks are quantitatively important for the overall volatility of output growth.
The co-existence of equilibria with high (low) interest rates and high (low) default rates
relates to a literature on self-fulfilling sovereign debt crises. In a two-period model, Calvo
1Khan et al. (2016) introduce firm dynamics and default risk in a macroeconomic model and show that
countercyclical default affect the capital allocation among firms, which amplifies and propagate real and
financial shocks. Unlike our model, there is no role for self-fulfilling expectations.
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(1988) shows how multiple equilibria emerge from a positive feedback between interest rates
and debt levels. Lorenzoni and Werning (2013) extend this idea to a dynamic setting to
study the role of fiscal policy rules and debt accumulation for the occurrence of debt crises.
On the other hand, Cole and Kehoe (2000) find that self-fulfilling debt crises occur because
governments cannot roll over their debt (cf. Conesa and Kehoe (2015) Aguiar et al. (2013)).
Our mechanism for multiplicity is different from these contributions by emphasizing the
role of expectations about future credit conditions. We further focus on strategic default of
borrowers in general equilibrium.
2 VAR Evidence
In this section we examine the separate roles of the default rate, credit spreads and the
recovery rate for output dynamics on the basis of a vector autoregression model. We obtain
data for the recovery rate and the all-rated default rate for Moody’s rated corporate bonds,
covering the period 1982–2015, all in percentage terms, and we use the credit spread index
developed by Gilchrist and Zakrajˇsek (2012) that is representative for the full corporate bond
market.2 Output is defined as the sum of private consumption and private investment in the
U.S. national accounts. Output growth refers to the growth rate of real per capita output.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Spread Recovery Rate Default Rate Output Growth
Spread 1 -0.38 0.63 -0.58
Recovery Rate - 1 -0.73 0.32
Default Rate - - 1 -0.52
Output Growth - - - 1
Mean (%) 2.00 42.15 1.715 1.719
Standard dev. (%) 0.87 9.13 1.23 1.91
Table 1 shows the correlation structure of these four variables. As expected, the default
rate and the credit spread are highly positively correlated, and both of them are counter-
cyclical. The recovery rate is highly negatively correlated with the default rate, but less with
the credit spread and it is mildly procyclical.
In order to further understand their relationships, we order the four variables according
to [spread, recovery, default, Output Growth]’ and estimate a structural VAR model using
2Moody’s data are obtained from the 2015 annual report published by Moody’s Investors Service. The
recovery rate is measured by the post-default bond price for one dollar repayment. Regarding the spread
series, we consider annual averages of the monthly series, updated until 2015 (see Simon Gilchrist’s website
http://people.bu.edu/sgilchri/Data/data.htm).
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Figure 1: VAR Evidence. Note: “s”: credit spread, “r”: recovery rate, “d”: default rate, and
“g”: output growth rate. All variables are in percentage terms. The dotted lines are 5% and 95%
intervals
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a standard Cholesky decomposition. We rank financial market variables before the macro
variable. Notice that default is put as the last of financial market variables, so that exogenous
shocks to default should have the least impact. Different orderings of financial variables do
not significantly change the results. Figure 1 presents impulse responses functions from the
VAR estimation and 90% confidence bands from 1000 boostrap draws.
An immediate observation is that a shock that raises default rate on impact does not
lead to the rise of spread in the 2nd period. The subsequent fall of default pushes down
the spread, but the magnitude of fall in spread is smaller. At the same time, it pushes up
the recovery rate and depresses real output growth. Notice that even if one considers the
increase of recovery rate, the fall of spreads is still smaller than the fall of default rate.
In the model that we consider below, the default rate is most strongly affected by changes
in self-fulfilling beliefs. Believes into higher default rates lead to a cut in lending and higher
credit spreads. The fall in credit induces a decline in economic activity. Since lending is
reduced, given the constant recovery ability, lenders can recover more per unit of lending,
which explains why the measured recovery rate goes up.
This VAR exercise shows that the recovery rate, credit spreads, and the default rate seem
to have a non-trivial relationship. Different shocks in the financial market can cause different
responses both in the financial market itself and in the real economy. This finding motivates
us to develop a macroeconomic model with borrowing constrained firms and endogenous
default, which takes into account different mechanisms by which default, recovery rates,
and spreads are affected by macroeconomic shocks. Credit market conditions impact firms
with different productivity levels so that the real economy responds to changes in the credit
market.
3 An Illustrative Example
We present a simple partial equilibrium model to illustrate how default rates, credit spreads
and leverage can vary in response to changes in self-fulfilling expectations. The model has a
large number of firms who live through infinitely many discrete periods t ≥ 0. Firm owners
are risk-averse and maximize discounted expected utility
E0
∑
t≥0
βt
[
(1− β) log ct − ηt
]
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where ct is consumption (dividend payout) in period t, β < 1 is the discount factor, and
ηt is a default loss that materializes only when the firm defaults in period t.
3 For example,
the default loss may reflect the additional labor effort of the firm owner in a default event.4
The default loss is idiosyncratic and stochastic: with probability p it is zero, otherwise it is
∆ > 0. Hence in any given period, fraction p of the firms are more prone to default.
All firms are endowed with one unit of net worth in period zero and they have access to a
linear technology that transforms one unit of the consumption good in period t into Π units of
the good in period t+1. Firms may obtain one-period credit from perfectly competitive and
risk-neutral investors who have an outside investment opportunity at rate of return R¯ < Π.
Although firms cannot commit to repay their debt, there is a record-keeping technology that
makes it possible to exclude defaulting firms from all future credit. That is, if a firm decides
to default, it is subject to the default utility loss (if any) in the default period and it may
not borrow in all future periods.
Investors offer standard debt contracts that specify the interest rate R and the volume
of debt b. Competition between investors ensures that the offered contracts (R, b) maximize
the borrower’s utility subject to the investors’ participation constraint. The latter requires
that the expected return equals the outside return R¯ per unit of debt.
In recursive notation, a firm owner’s utility V (ω) depends on the firm’s net worth ω and
satisfies the Bellman equation
V (ω) = max
c,s,(R,b)
(1− β) log(c) + βEmax
{
V (ω′), V d(ω′d)− η
}
, s.t. (1)
c = ω − s ,
ω′ = Π(s+ b)−Rb ,
ω′d = Π(s+ b) ,
E(R · b) = R¯ · b .
The firm owner chooses consumption, savings, and a particular credit contract (R, b), subject
to the investors’ participation constraint. Next period, she can choose to repay and obtain
net worth ω′; she can also choose to default and obtain net worth ω′d, in which case she has
to bear the default cost. The second maximization expresses the optimal ex-post default
choice at the beginning of the next period, and the expectation operator E is over the
3The utility cost with log utility ensure that there is closed form solution for binary choice of default
and no-default. See Cui (2014) for a similar treatment of binary choice of selling capital or being inactive.
4Alternatively, we may assume in this example, as well as in the full macro model of the next section,
that a defaulting firm’s net worth is subject to a real default cost shock. This alternative model has the same
credit market equilibrium but slightly different aggregate dynamics. Details are available upon request.
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firm’s realization of the default cost η ∈ {0,∆}. The defaulting firm is further punished by
exclusion from future credit: V d(.) is the utility value of a firm with a default history, which
satisfies the recursion
V d(ω) = max
c,s
(1− β) log(c) + βV d(ω′) , s.t. (2)
c = ω − s ,
ω′ = Πs .
We show in the Appendix A (proof of Proposition 2) that all firms save s = βω and that
value functions take the simple forms
V (ω) = log(ω) + V ,
V d(ω) = log(ω) + V d ,
where V and V d are independent of the firm’s net worth. We write v ≡ V − V d to express
the surplus value of access to credit; it is a forward-looking variable that reflects expected
credit conditions. Using this notation, we can write the value function as V (ω) = maxs(1−
β) log(ω − s) + β[V d + U(s)] where U(s) is the surplus value of the optimal credit contract
for a firm with savings s. It solves the problem
U(s) ≡ max
(R,b)
Emax
{
log[Π(s+ b)−Rb] + v, log[Π(s+ b)]− η
}
s.t.
R¯b = E(Rb) =

Rb if log[Π(s+ b)−Rb] + v ≥ log[Π(s+ b)] ,
(1− p)Rb if log[Π(s+ b)] > log[Π(s+ b)−Rb] + v ≥ log[Π(s+ b)]−∆ ,
0 else.
The participation constraint captures three possible outcomes. In the first case, the firm
repays for any realization of the default loss in which case investors are fully repaid Rb. In
the second case, the firm only repays when the default loss is positive, which is reflected in
the expected payment (1− p)Rb. In the third case, the firm defaults with certainty.
It is straightforward to characterize the optimal contract.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the parameter condition
(e∆ − 1)(1− p)
e∆ − 1 + p <
R¯
Π
<
(e(1−p)∆ − e−p∆)(1− p)
e(1−p)∆ − 1 (3)
holds. Then there exists a threshold value v¯ ∈ (0, vmax) with vmax ≡ log(Π/(Π − R¯)), such
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that
(i) If v ∈ [v¯, vmax), the optimal contract is (R, b) = (R¯, b(s)) with debt level and borrower
utility
b(s) = s
Π(1− e−v)
R¯− Π(1− e−v) , U(s) = log
[ R¯Πs
R¯− Π(1− e−v)
]
.
(ii) If v ∈ [0, v¯), the optimal contract is (R, b) = (R¯/(1 − p), b(s)), with debt level and
borrower utility
b(s) = s
Π(1− p)(1− e−v−∆)
R¯− Π(1− p)(1− e−v−∆) , U(s) = log
[ R¯Πs
R¯− Π(1− p)(1− e−v−∆)
]
−(1−p)∆ .
Proof. See Appendix A.
If expected credit conditions are good enough, v ≥ v¯, the threat of credit market exclusion
is so severe that no firm defaults in the optimal contract. The corresponding debt level is the
largest one that prevents default of firms with zero default loss whose binding enforcement
constraint is log[Π(s + b) − Rb] + v = log[Π(s + b)]. A feasible solution to the optimal
contracting problem further requires that debt is finite which necessitates v < vmax.
Alternatively, if expected credit conditions are not so good, v < v¯, the optimal contract
allows for partial default since it is then relatively costly to prevent default of all firms.
Instead, fraction p of firms default in the optimal contract, whereas firms with positive
default cost are willing to repay which is ensured by log[Π(s+b)−Rb]+v = log[Π(s+b)]−∆.
The parameter conditions (3) imply that both outcomes are optimal for different values
of expected credit conditions. If one of these inequalities fails, either no default (i) or partial
default (ii) is the optimal contract for all feasible values of v.
Expected credit conditions v depend themselves on the state of the credit market and are
determined in a stationary equilibrium by the forward-looking Bellman equations (1) and
(2). After substitution of U(s) from Proposition 1, it is straightforward to show that the
value difference v = V − V d satisfies the fixed-point equation
v = f(v) ≡
 β log
[
R¯
R¯−Π(1−e−v)
]
if v ≥ v¯ ,
β
{
log
[
R¯
R¯−Π(1−p)(1−e−v−∆)
]
− (1− p)∆
}
if v < v¯ .
Any solution of this equation constitutes a stationary equilibrium of this economy. Under
the conditions of Proposition 2, it can be verified that f is increasing and continuous, and it
satisfies f(0) > 0 and f(v)→∞ for v → vmax. This shows that, generically, the fixed-point
equation has either no solution, or two solutions. Moreover, if f(v¯) < v¯ holds, there is one
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Figure 2: Co-existence of Default and No-Default Equilibria
0 Dv Nvv v
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equilibrium at vD < v¯ which involves default and a positive interest spread together with
another equilibrium at vN > v¯ which has no default and a zero spread (see Figure 2). This
result is summarized as follows.5
Proposition 2. Suppose that parameters satisfy
( R¯
R¯− Π(1− e−v¯)
)β
<
Π[1− (1− p)e−p∆]
Π− R¯ + e(1−p)∆(R¯− Π(1− p)) , (4)
as well as condition (3). Then there are two stationary credit market equilibria vD < vN
such that default rates and interest spreads are positive at vD and zero at vN .
Proof. See Appendix A.
The main insight of this proposition is that the state of the credit market is a matter of
self-fulfilling expectations. A well-functioning credit market with a low interest rate and a
low default rate is highly valuable for firms, and this high valuation makes credit contracts
without default self-enforcing. Conversely, a weak credit market with a higher interest rate
and more default is valued less by the firms, and therefore it cannot sustain credit contracts
that prevent default.
5If the parameter condition (4) (which is equivalent to f(v¯) < v¯) fails, there can exist at most two
equilibria with default, or at most two equilibria without default. Since function f is convex and kinks
upwards at v¯, there cannot be more than two equilibria.
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Although the two equilibria are clearly ranked in terms of default rates, interest rates
and utility, it is worth noticing that leverage, defined as the debt-to-equity ratio b(s)/s, can
be higher or lower in the no-default state compared to the default state. On the one hand,
the lower interest rate and the higher credit market valuation at the no-default equilibrium
permit a greater leverage. On the other hand, preventing default of all firms requires a
tighter borrowing constraint compared to the one that induces only firms with high default
costs to repay.6
The additional parameter condition (4) of Proposition 2 is fulfilled whenever the discount
factor β is low enough (because the fraction on the right-hand side is strictly greater than
one). Conversely, the condition fails if β is sufficiently large.7 In other words, a prerequisite
for weak credit markets is that future consumption is discounted enough.
While the previous analysis describes stationary equilibria, this partial equilibrium model
also gives rise to self-fulfilling sunspot cycles in which the economy fluctuates perpetually
between states of positive spreads and default and states with zero spreads and no default:8
Proposition 3. Under the condition of Proposition 2, there exists a stochastic equilibrium
in which the economy alternates between states with positive default v1 < v¯ and states without
default v2 > v¯ with transition probability pi ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. See Appendix A.
4 The Macroeconomic Model
We extend the insights of the previous section to a dynamic general equilibrium economy.
The main departures from the partial model are as follows: (i) the safe interest rate is
determined in credit market equilibrium; (ii) lenders can recover some of their exposure
in default events; (iii) defaulters are not permanently excluded; (iv) due to idiosyncratic
6To give a numeric example, set β = 0.9, Π = 1, R¯ = 0.92, p = 0.1, and two values of the default loss,
∆ = 0.2 and ∆ = 0.4. For both values of ∆, there is a no-default equilibrium at vN ≈ 0.43 with leverage
b/s ≈ 0.61. For ∆ = 0.2, the default equilibrium at vD ≈ 0.11 has lower leverage b/s ≈ 0.35. For ∆ = 0.4,
leverage at the default equilibrium vD ≈ 0.2 is b/s ≈ 0.79. Hence, the default equilibrium can have higher
leverage than the no-default equilibrium: the greater default loss relaxes the borrowing constraint which is
imposed to preclude default of high-cost firms, while permitting default of the other firms.
7In this limiting case infinite debt levels would become sustainable, so that this partial model has no
equilibrium at the given (low) interest rate R¯ < Π. In the general-equilibrium model of the next section
there always exists an equilibrium since the endogenous interest rate would rise when β becomes sufficiently
large.
8Since the relationship between credit market expectations in periods t and t + 1 is monotonic (see
Figure 2), there are no deterministic cycles. The existence of sunspot cycles rests on a continuity argument
(cf. Chiappori and Guesnerie (1991)) in the presence of multiple steady states; see the proof of Proposition 3
in the Appendix.
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productivity shocks the credit market impacts aggregate factor productivity; (v) we introduce
aggregate shocks to study business-cycle implications. These include fundamental shocks
(technology and financial variables) as well as sunspot shocks.
4.1 The Setup
Firms and Workers
The model has a unit mass of infinitely-lived firm owners with the same preferences as in
the previous section: period utility is (1− β) log(c)− η where c is consumption and β is the
discount factor. The idiosyncratic default loss η is distributed with cumulative function G
which is assumed to have no mass points.
All firms operate a production technology which produces output (consumption and
investment goods) y = (zk)α(At`)
1−α from inputs capital k and labor ` with capital share
α ∈ (0, 1). At is time-varying aggregate productivity that grows over time and is hit by
exogenous productivity shocks,9 logAt = µ
A
t +logAt−1, where µ
A
t follows a stationary process
with mean µA.
Firms can have high or low capital productivity z, and the idiosyncratic productivity state
follows an i.i.d process. Specifically, a firm obtains high productivity zH with probability pi
and low productivity zL = γzH with 1− pi. To simplify algebra, we assume that the capital
productivity shock affects the stock of capital (rather than the capital service), so that the
firm’s capital stock at the end of the period is (1− δ)zk, where δ is the depreciation rate.
Next to firm owners, the economy includes a mass of workers who supply labor l and who
consume their labor earnings c = wl. Their preferences are represented by a modified GHH
utility function that allows for balanced growth paths, u
(
ct − Atκl
1+ν
t
1+ν
)
, where u is increasing
and concave, and κ, ν > 0.10 Workers are hand-to-mouth and supply labor according to
wt/At = κl
ν
t . (5)
That workers are hand-to-mouth consumers is not a strong restriction but follows from
imposing a zero borrowing constraint on workers: If workers have the same discount factor
β as firm owners, they do not wish to save in the steady-state equilibrium in which the
gross interest rate satisfies R¯ < 1/β so that workers’ consumption equals labor income in all
periods.11
9To simplify notation, we use time index t to indicate time-varying aggregate variables. Idiosyncratic
variables carry no index since we formulate them in recursive notation below.
10The reason behind this utility function is that over time technological growth also increases the quality
of leisure time (see Mertens and Ravn (2011)).
11This standard argument extends to a stochastic equilibrium around a steady-state equilibrium as long
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Consider a firm operating the capital stock k. In the labor market, the firm hires workers
at the competitive wage rate wt. This leads to labor demand which is proportional to the
firm’s effective capital input zk, so that the firm’s net worth (before debt repayment) is
Πtzk, where the gross return per efficiency unit of capital is (see Appendix A for details)
Πt = α
[
(1− α)At
wt
] 1−α
α
+ 1− δ . (6)
Credit Market
The credit market channels funds from low-productivity firms (lenders) to high-productivity
firms (borrowers). Competitive, risk-neutral banks pool the savings of lenders, taking the
safe lending rate R¯t as given, and offer credit contracts to borrowers. Issuing credit is costly:
per unit of debt, a bank needs to pay intermediation cost Φt.
For one, Φt captures administrative credit costs, such as the screening and monitor-
ing of borrowers. Furthermore, although banks insure lenders against idiosyncratic default
risks, they need to buy insurance against the aggregate component of default risk which can
be obtained from unmodeled (foreign) insurance companies selling credit default swaps.12
Therefore, we assume that Φt includes such insurance premia, in addition to the adminis-
trative credit costs. Φt may be subject to shocks which stand for disturbances in financial
intermediation or for time-varying liquidity or risk premia.13 These shocks directly affect
the interest spread between borrowing and lending rates.
Credit contracts take the form (R, b), where R is the gross borrowing rate, which reflects
the firm’s default risk, and b is the firm’s debt. As in the previous section, the debt level in
the optimal contract is proportional to the firm’s internal funds (equity). Moreover, because
all borrowing firms face the same ex-ante default incentives, the debt-to-equity ratio for all
borrowing firms is the same and only depends on the aggregate state. This implies that we
can write the equilibrium contract as (Rt, θt) where θt is the debt-to-equity ratio for any
borrowing firm. We derive this optimal contract below.
If a firm borrows in period t and decides to default in period t+ 1, creditors can recover
fraction λt of the borrower’s gross return Πtzk. The recovery parameter λt stands for the
as shocks are not too large.
12Without this assumption, which is similar to Jeske et al. (2013), banks cannot offer a safe lending rate to
depositors in combination with standard credit contracts. In the absence of such insurance against aggregate
risk, competitive banks would offer risky securities to lenders to fund credit to high-productivity firms.
13See cf. Gilchrist and Zakrajˇsek (2012). By focusing on the role of self-fulfilling beliefs, we choose to
simplify here and do not model the reasons that generate endogenous fluctuations of the excess premium.
In our quantitative analysis, however, we take into account that variations of the excess premium can be
correlated with credit market variables.
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fraction of collateral assets that can be seized in the event of a default. It may be subject to
“financial shocks” which can be understood as disturbances to the collateral value or to the
cost of liquidation.14 The owner of the defaulting firm keeps share (1 − λt)ζ of the assets,
where ζ < 1 is a real default cost parameter. In subsequent periods, the firm carries a default
flag which prevents access to credit. In any period following default, however, the default
flag disappears with probability ψ in which case the firm regains full access to the credit
market.15
Timing
Within each period, the timing is as follows. First, the aggregate state Xt = (At, λt,Φt, εt)
realizes. The first three components are the fundamental parameters described before which
follow a Markov process. εt is a sunspot shock which is uncorrelated over time. Next to
the aggregate state vector, idiosyncratic default costs η realize and indebted firms either
repay their debt or opt for default. Firms with a default history lose the default flag with
probability ψ. Second, firms learn their idiosyncratic productivity z ∈ {zL, zH} and make
savings and borrowing decisions. Third, workers are hired and production takes place.
4.2 Equilibrium Characterization
Credit Market
Write V (ω;Xt) for the value of a firm with a clean credit record and net worth ω in period
t after default decisions have been made. Similarly, V d(ω;Xt) denotes the value of a firm
with a default flag. A borrowing firm with net worth ω in period t chooses savings s and a
credit contract (θ, R) to maximize
(1−β) log(ω−s)+βEt max
{
V
(
(zHt Πt(1+θ)−θR)s;Xt+1
)
, V d
(
zHt Πt(1+θ)(1−λt)ζs;Xt+1
)
−η′
}
,
where the expectation is over the realization of the aggregate state Xt+1 and the idiosyncratic
default cost η′ in period t+ 1. A borrower who does not default earns the leveraged return
14See e.g. Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Jermann and Quadrini (2012) for a similar modeling approach.
See Chen (2010) for cyclical recovery rates.
15Such default events can stand for a liquidation (such as Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code) of the
firm in which case the owner can start a new business with harmed access to credit, or for a reorganization
(such as Chapter 11) in which case the same firm continues operation but may suffer from a prolonged
deterioration of the credit rating which makes access to credit difficult. See Corbae and D’Erasmo (2016)
for a structural model of firm dynamics that includes an endogenous choice of the type of bankruptcy.
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zHt Πt(1 + θ) − θR and has continuation utility V (.), whereas a defaulter earns zHt Πt(1 +
θ)(1− λt)ζ, incurs the default loss η′ and has continuation utility V d(.).
We show in the Appendix A that these value functions take the form V (d)(ω,Xt) =
log(ω) + V (d)(Xt), and we write vt ≡ V (Xt) − V d(Xt) to denote the surplus value of a
clean credit record (“credit market expectations”). Write ρ ≡ R/(zHt Πt) for the interest rate
relative to the borrowers’ capital return. Then the objective of a borrowing firm can be
rewritten16
(1− β) log(ω− s) + β log(s) + βEt max
{
log[1 + θ(1− ρ)], log[(1 + θ)(1− λt)ζ]− η′− vt+1
}
.
It is immediate that every borrower saves s = βω. Moreover, there is an ex-post default
threshold level
η˜′ = log
[(1 + θ)(1− λt)ζ
1 + θ(1− ρ)
]
− vt+1 , (7)
such that the borrower defaults if and only if η′ < η˜′. The threshold η˜′ varies with next
period’s credit market value vt+1 and with the contract (θ, ρ).
Competitive banks offer contracts (θ, ρ). If a bank issues aggregate credit B = θS (to
borrowers with aggregate equity S), it needs to raise funds θS from lenders. In the next
period t+ 1, the bank repays R¯tθS to lenders, it pays the intermediation cost, and it earns
risky revenue (1−G(η˜′))RθS +G(η˜′)λt(1 + θ)S where η˜′ is the ex-post default threshold for
this contract. Competition drives expected bank profits to zero, which implies that
ρ¯t(1 + Φt) = Et
{
(1−G(η˜′))ρ+G(η˜′)λt1 + θ
θ
}
, (8)
where ρ¯t ≡ R¯t/(zHt Πt) measures the safe interest rate relative to the borrowers’ capital
return. The right-hand side of (8) is the expected gross revenue per unit of debt (relative to
zHt Πt). In default events η
′ < η˜′, banks can recover λt(1+θ)/θ per unit of debt. Under perfect
competition, the contracts offered in equilibrium maximize borrowers’ expected utility,
Et
{
(1−G(η˜′)) log[1 + θ(1− ρ)] +
∫ η˜′
−∞
log[(1 + θ)(1− λt)ζ]− η′ − vt+1 dG(η′)
}
,
subject to the ex-post default choice (7) and the zero-profit condition for banks (8).
We characterize the optimal contract as follows:
Proposition 4. Given a safe interest rate ρ¯t, collateral parameter λt, intermediation cost
Φt, and (stochastic) credit market expectations vt+1, the optimal credit contract in period
16The constant terms log(zHt Πt) + EV (Xt+1) are irrelevant for the maximization and hence cancel out.
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t, denoted (θt, ρt), together with the ex-post (stochastic) default threshold η˜t+1 satisfy the
following equations:
η˜t+1 = log
[(1− λt)ζ
1− ξt
]
− vt+1 , (9)
θt =
ρ¯t(1 + Φt)
ρ¯t(1 + Φt)− Et [λtG(η˜t+1) + ξt(1−G(η˜t+1))] − 1 , (10)
Et[G′(η˜t+1)(ξt − λt)] = Et(1−G(η˜t+1))
{
1− ρ¯t(1 + Φt)− Et[G(η˜t+1)(ξt − λt)]
}
, (11)
with ξt ≡ ρtθt/(1 + θt).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Conditions (9) and (10) are the ex-post default choice and the zero-profit condition
of banks, respectively. Condition (11) is the first-order condition of the contract value
maximization problem.17
As in the partial model of the previous section, credit market expectations vt depend
themselves on the state of the credit market, satisfying the recursive equation (see Appendix
A for a derivation):
vt =βpiEt
{
log(1 + θt) + log(1− λt) + log ζ − η˜t+1[1−G(η˜t+1)]−
∫ η˜t+1
−∞
η dG(η)
}
+ β(1− ψ − pi)Etvt+1 . (12)
The value of access to the credit market in period t includes two terms. First, with probability
pi the firm becomes a borrower in which case it benefits from higher leverage θt, whereas a
higher expected default threshold η˜t+1 reduces the value of borrowing. Second, the term
β(1− ψ − pi)Etvt+1 captures the discounted value of credit market access from period t+ 1
onward.
General Equilibrium
In the competitive equilibrium, firms and banks behave optimally as specified above, and
the capital and labor market are in equilibrium.
Consider first the capital market. The gross lending rate R¯t cannot fall below the capital
return of unproductive firms zLt Πt, which implies that ρ¯t ≥ γ = zL/zH . When ρ¯t > γ,
unproductive firms invest all their savings in the capital market; they only invest in their
17In our parameterizations with normally distributed default costs we verify that the second-order condi-
tion is also satisfied and that the solution is indeed a global maximum.
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own inferior technology if ρ¯t = γ. Therefore, capital market equilibrium implies the following
complementary slackness condition:
γ ≤ ρ¯t , ftpiθt ≤ (1− pi) , (13)
where ft ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction of aggregate net worth owned by firms with access to credit.
The left-hand side of the second inequality is total borrowing (as a share of capital): fraction
ftpi of capital is owned by borrowers and θt is borrowing per unit of equity. The right-hand
side (1 − pi) is the share of capital owned by unproductive firms, which is fully invested in
the capital market if the safe interest rate ρ¯t exceeds γ. Otherwise, if ρ¯t = γ, a fraction of
the capital of unproductive firms is invested in their own businesses.
Let Ωt be the domestic aggregate net worth at the beginning of period t. Then, the
capital stock operated by productive firms is KHt = βΩtpi
[
ft(1 + θt) + 1 − ft
]
. Savings of
productive firms in period t are βΩtpi. Fraction ft of this is owned by borrowing firms whose
capital is 1 + θt per unit of internal funds. Fraction 1− ft is owned by firms without access
to credit whose capital is all internally funded. The capital stock operated by unproductive
firms is KLt = βΩt [(1− pi)− piftθt]. That is, these firms use the fraction of savings that is
not invested in the capital market.
Since the labor market is frictionless, labor demand of any firm is proportional to the
efficiency units of capital: ` = zk[(1 − α)A1−αt /wt]1/α. Since labor supply l satisfies κlνt =
wt/At, if we impose credit market clearing condition (13), the real wage that clears the labor
market satisfies
w
ν+α
ν
t (κAt)
−α
ν = (1− α)A1−αt (βΩt)α
(
zL
[
(1− pi)− piftθt
]
+ zHpi
[
ft(1 + θt) + 1− ft
])α
.
(14)
It remains to describe the evolution of the aggregate net worth Ωt and the share ft of net
worth owned by firms with credit market access. The aggregate net worth in period t+ 1 is
Ωt+1 = βz
HΠtΩt
{
(1−pi)ρ¯t+pift
[
(1−G(η˜t+1))(1+θt(1−ρt))+G(η˜t+1)(1+θt)(1−λt)ζ
]
+pi(1−ft)
}
.
(15)
In period t, all firms save fraction β of their net worth. Fraction 1−pi are unproductive and
earn return zHΠtρ¯t = R¯t. Fraction pift of aggregate savings is invested by borrowing firms
of which fraction 1−G(η˜t+1) do not default and G(η˜t+1) default in t+ 1. Fraction pi(1− ft)
of aggregate savings is invested by productive firms without credit market access who earn
return zHΠt.
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The net worth of firms with credit market access in period t+ 1 is
ft+1Ωt+1 = βz
HΠtΩt
{
(1−pi)ftρ¯t+pift(1−G(η˜t+1))(1+θt(1−ρt))+(1−ft)ψ[(1−pi)ρ¯t+pi]
}
.
The right-hand side of this equation is explained as follows. Fraction ft of net worth is
owned by firms with access to the credit market in period t. Fraction 1 − pi of these firms
earn ρ¯tz
HΠt, and fraction pi(1−G(η˜t+1)) of firms borrow and do not default, earning return
[1 + θt(1 − ρt)]zHΠt. All these firms retain access to the credit market in the next period.
Fraction 1 − ft of net worth is owned by firms without access to credit in period t. They
earn ρ¯tz
HΠt with probability 1 − pi, and zHΠt with probability pi, and they regain access
to the credit market with probability ψ. Adding up the net worth of all these firms gives
the net worth of firms with credit market access in period t + 1, ft+1Ωt+1. Division of this
expression by (15) yields
ft+1 =
ft
[
(1− pi)ρ¯t + pi(1−G(η˜t+1))(1 + θt(1− ρt))
]
+ (1− ft)ψ[(1− pi)ρ¯t + pi]
(1− pi)ρ¯t + pift
[
(1−G(η˜t+1))(1 + θt(1− ρt)) +G(η˜t+1)(1 + θt)(1− λt)ζ
]
+ pi(1− ft)
.
(16)
A competitive equilibrium describes wages, credit contracts, aggregate net worth and
capital, policy and value functions of firms such that: (i) firms make optimal savings and
borrowing decisions, and borrowing firms decide optimally about default; (ii) banks make
zero expected profits by offering standard debt contracts to borrowers and safe interest rates
to lenders; (iii) the labor and the capital market are in equilibrium. The characterization of
equilibrium described above is summarized as follows.
Definition 1. Given an initial state (f0,Ω0) and an exogenous stochastic process for the
state Xt = (At, λt,Φt, εt), a competitive equilibrium is a mapping (ft, Ωt, Xt) → (ft+1, Ωt+1,
Xt+1), together with a stochastic process for (η˜t, θt, ρt, ρ¯t, vt, Πt, wt) as a function of (ft,
Ωt, Xt), satisfying the equations (6), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16).
In Appendix B, we describe the steady-state solutions of this model, where we focus on
those steady states where ρ¯ = γ, which implies that some capital is used in low-productivity
firms so that aggregate factor productivity responds endogenously to the state of the credit
market.
As in the illustrative example of the previous section, this more general model typically
generates two steady state, one of which is locally indeterminate and hence susceptible
to sunspot shocks. Key for the possibility of self-fulfilling beliefs is the forward-looking
dynamics of credit market expectations, described by equation (12), which entails a positive
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relationship (a dynamic complementarity) between future credit market values and today’s
value.
To formalize this idea, add Etεt+1 = 0 to the right-hand side of equation (12) and
rewrite this equation as vt = Etf(X˜t, X˜t+1, vt+1) + Etεt+1, where X˜t+1 = (At, λt,Φt) is the
fundamental state vector. If f is monotonically increasing in vt+1, this equation can be solved
for vt+1 = f˜(X˜t, X˜t+1, vt−εt+1), where f˜(X1, X2, .) is the inverse of f(X1, X2, .). If the steady
state is indeterminate, this forward solution of equation (12) is a stationary process which
means that vt can be treated as a predetermined variable which is subject to changes in
self-fulfilling beliefs in period t+ 1. That is, the sunspot realization εt+1 alters credit market
expectations vt+1 which, in turn, impacts the default threshold in period t+ 1 via equation
(9).
Note that, because f˜ is increasing in vt − εt+1, positive realizations of the sunspot affect
credit market expectations negatively, raising default rates. In the quantitative analysis of
the next section, we allow the sunspot state εt+1 to depend on fundamental shocks as well
as on pure sunspot shocks that are unrelated to fundamentals. Such fundamental or non-
fundamental shocks all correspond to self-fulfilling belief changes, as long as they satisfy the
restriction Etεt+1 = 0.
5 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we explore quantitative implications of the model. We first calibrate the (inde-
terminate) deterministic steady state to suitable long-run targets. Then, in order to analyze
the dynamics around the steady state, we estimate financial shocks and aggregate produc-
tivity shocks to account for the dynamics of recovery rates, default rates, credit spreads, and
output growth.
5.1 Parameterizations
We assume that η is normally distributed with mean µ and variance σ2. Given that we
consider annual time series for default rates and recovery rates (cf. Section 2), we calibrate
the model at annual frequency. There are 15 model parameters:
1. Preferences: β, κ, and ν.
2. Technology: α, δ, µA, zH , zL, and pi.
3. Financial markets: ψ, λ, ζ, Φ, µ, and σ.
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Table 2: Parameters (Steady State)
Parameter Value Explanation/Target
β 0.9420 Capital-output ratio
α 0.3300 Capital income share
δ 0.0800 Depreciation rate
µA 0.0172 Trend growth
κ 1.8853 Labor supply ` = 0.25
ν 1/2 Macro labor supply elasticity 1/ν = 2
pi 0.1500 Constrained firms (Almeida et al. 2004)
ζ 0.8500 15% default loss (Davydenko et al. 2012)
ψ 0.1000 10-year default flag
λ 0.2374 Recovery rate 42.15%
Φ 0.0099 Credit spread 2%
zH 1.1263 Debt-output ratio 0.82
zL 0.8400 Normalization
µ 0.0383 Default rate 1.72%
σ 0.0584 Leverage θ = 2.85
Directly calibrated are 1 − α = 0.67 (labor share), δ = 0.08 (annual depreciation rate),
µA = 0.0172 (growth rate of per capita output), 1 − ζ = 0.15 (direct net-worth losses
in default, see Davydenko et al. (2012)), and ψ = 0.1 which implies a ten-year exclusion
period.18
According to Fiorito and Zanella (2012) and Keane and Rogerson (2012), the macro labor
supply elasticity that allows for both intensive and extensive margin adjustments should be
1.5–2, so we set the labor supply elasticity to 1/ν = 2. We then set κ = 1.8853 by arbitrarily
normalizing steady-state labor supply at 0.25. We set probability pi = 0.15 so that 15 percent
of firms are financially constrained (Almeida et al. (2004)), Kaplan and Zingales (1997)).
We normalize average capital productivity at z˜ = pizH + (1−pi)zL + fpiθ(zH − zL) = 1.19
The normalization pins down zH , given parameters pi, zL, the debt-to-equity ratio θ, and
the steady-state value of the fraction of firms with credit market access f .
The remaining six parameters are calibrated jointly to match the following targets: (i)
the capital-output ratio K/Y = 2; (ii) the credit-output ratio B/Y = 0.82, based on all
(non-financial) firm credit 1982–2015; (iii) the leverage ratio θ = 2.85 in credit-constrained
18This corresponds to the bankruptcy flag for sole proprietors (or for partnerships with personal liabilities)
filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
19Without this normalization, δ would not be the depreciation rate of this economy: (1 − δ)z˜Kt of the
capital stock survives to the next period. Hence, depreciation is Kt − (1− δ)z˜Kt, and the depreciation rate
is 1− (1− δ)z˜ which equals δ if and only if z˜ = 1.
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firms;20 (iv) a recovery rate of 42.15%; (v) a 1.72% default rate; (vi) a 2% credit spread (see
Section 2). These targets identify the six parameters β, µ, σ, γ = zL/zH , λ and Φ uniquely.
The discount factor β determines the investment rate and the capital-output ratio. The
average default cost µ determines the default rate. The recovery parameter λ is identified
from the recovery rate, and Φ is calibrated to match the excess bond premium (i.e. the
fraction of the spread not accounted for by expected default losses). The remaining two
parameters, the variance of default costs σ and the productivity ratio γ, are determined
from average credit and the leverage ratio of constrained firms. For details how we calculate
these parameters from the calibration targets, see Appendix B. All parameter values are
shown in Table 2.
We linearize the system around the deterministic steady state. We then explore the
equilibrium dynamics in response to all three financial shocks (spread shocks, collateral
shocks, and sunspots) together with productivity shocks. That is, besides estimating the
shocks to µAt , we estimate shocks to the recovery parameter λt, intermediation cost Φt, and
sunspots εt.
We use the time series data for the recovery rate, default rate, spreads, and output
growth described in Section 2. We use the maximum likelihood method and estimate AR(1)
processes for Φt, µ
A
t , λt and finally the sunspot εt which satisfy
log(1 + Φt)− log(1 + Φ) = ρΦ [log(1 + Φt−1)− log(1 + Φ)] + ξΦt ,
log(1 + µAt )− log(1 + µA) = ρA
[
log
(
1 + µAt−1
)− log (1 + µA)]+ ξAt ,
log(1 + λt)− log(1 + λ) = ρλ [log (1 + λt−1)− log (1 + λ)] + hΦλ ξΦt + hAλ ξAt + ξλt ,
εt = h
Φ
ε ξ
Φ
t + h
A
ε ξ
A
t + h
λ
εξ
λ
t + ξ
ε
t ,
where ρΦ, ρA, and ρλ are persistence parameters, and ξ
Φ
t , ξ
A
t , ξ
λ
t and ξ
ε
t are i.i.d. normally dis-
tributed with mean zero and variances σ2Φ, σ
2
A, σ
2
λ and σ
2
ε . These random variables are called
below “intermediation shocks”, “productivity shocks”, “collateral shocks”, and “sunspot
shocks”, respectively. Collateral shocks and sunspot shocks are essentially “credit demand”
shocks, while intermediation shocks affect the banks’ willingness to supply credit.
The idea behind this structure is as follows.21 Following Gilchrist and Zakrajˇsek (2012),
who find that “excess bond premium” can lead many important financial variables, we allow
intermediation shocks to also affect the recovery parameter λt as well as changes in credit
market expectations εt. In addition, we allow aggregate productivity shocks to affect λt and
20This corresponds to the 85th percentile of debt-equity ratios of firms in the Survey of Small Business
Finances 2003 (Federal Reserve Board) and to the 90th percentile in Compustat.
21We experimented with different specifications, such as setting the impact of productivity shocks on
financial variables to zero, and obtained very similar results.
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εt as well, in order to capture unmodelled linkages between the real economy and financial
markets. Further, we allow changes in the recovery ability to also take an impact on the
sunspot variable εt. Next to the impact of fundamental shocks on credit market expectations,
reflected in parameters hΦε , h
A
ε and h
λ
ε , there are also sunspot shocks ξ
ε
t that directly affect
the sunspot state εt.
Table 3 presents the estimation results. Intermediation shocks seem to generate the
most persistent effects (ρΦ is the largest among persistent parameters). The estimates of all
standard deviations of the shocks are highly significant, implying that all four shocks are
indeed important to capture different aspects of the business cycle.
Table 3: Estimation Results
Estimates Standard Deviation t statistics
ρΦ 0.7683 0.1457 5.2714
ρA 0.4390 0.2172 2.0216
ρλ 0.3345 0.1382 2.4204
σΦ 0.0060 0.0007 8.2375
σA 0.0390 0.0048 8.0485
σλ 0.0352 0.0059 5.9341
σε 0.0136 0.0022 6.2263
hΦε 0.7568 0.6519 1.1609
hAε -0.0421 0.1114 0.4079
hλε -0.3500 0.0816 4.2879
hΦλ -3.7504 1.0410 3.6027
hAλ -0.3357 0.1957 1.7156
Notice that the standard deviation of collateral shocks is almost six times of that of
intermediation shocks, while |hΦε | is only about twice as large as |hλε |. This comparison means
that the spill-over effect of intermediation shocks on sunspots is much weaker compared to
the one of collateral shocks on sunspots. Additionally, the effect of intermediation shocks on
sunspots is not significantly different from zero either. Using the same logic, we find that
the effect of productivity on sunspots is neither large nor significant.
Finally, when we look at spill-over effects on the recovery parameter λt, either from
intermediation shocks or from productivity shocks, it seems that the impact of intermediation
shocks is more important. This result is intuitive. High excess bond premia may reflect a
situation where assets cannot be easily liquidated so that the recovery of defaulted corporate
bonds is lower.
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5.2 Quantitative Results
Three sets of results are shown in the following. First, we show the smoothed shocks from the
maximum likelihood estimation exercise. Second, we illustrate the impulses responses after
one standard deviation for each of the shocks. Third, we show the variance decomposition
into the four independent shocks, and we illustrate the contribution of the credit market ex-
pectations channel for macroeconomic volatility. Finally, we compare the estimated sunspot
series with a measure of expected credit market condition from survey data, which we argue
provides some support for our theory.
Estimated Shocks
All four estimated shocks are plotted in Figure 3, normalized by their standard deviations.
Through the lens of our model, the 2007-2009 recession is indeed special compared to the
previous ones. It has a combination of a fall in recovery ability, deteriorated credit market
expectations (positive sunspot shocks), and the recession is led by a larger-than-usual inter-
mediation cost shock. Aggregate productivity shocks do not show a clear pattern but are
negative in 2007 and 2009.
The Great Recession featured a large liquidity and pledgeability drop of financial assets,
which is captured in our model by the negative shocks to the collateral value λ. Note also the
positive shocks to λ in the years prior to the Great Recession, which may reflect the real-estate
boom and the surge of collateral assets in this period. After the recession, innovations to λ
become positive but then stay almost at zero, possibly due to the asset-purchase programs
implemented by the Federal Reserve in 2009-2010.
The rise of shocks to intermediation costs in 2007 and 2008 reflects the sharp increase
of the “excess bond premium” induced by the banking crisis at the onset of the financial
crisis. Notice also the sharp fall of shocks to Φt in 2009 and 2010. Again, we can interpret
this result as a consequence of government intervention in asset markets which may have
significantly reduced risk aversion and other factors such as liquidity risks, contributing to
the fall in bond premia.
We can observe a deterioration of credit market expectations (positive sunspot shocks)
prior to all three recessions since 1982.22 As will become clear in impulse responses, sunspot
shocks are quantitatively important for the business cycle, since they can move leverage
significantly and thus affect output growth.
22Interestingly, the credit spread did not increase during the 1991 recession, despite a significant increase
of the default rate. This is mirrored in the absence of positive shocks to intermediation costs in this period.
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Figure 3: Estimated Shocks. Note: All shocks are normalized by their respective standard
deviations. Shaded areas are NBER dated recessions.
Impulse Responses
To gain intuition for the role of the four independent shocks, we illustrate the transmission
mechanisms by impulse response functions. We plot these functions for various variables
of interest. In all cases, the economy starts from steady state and is hit by one standard
deviation of a particular shock at time zero.
We first describe the impact of shocks to credit market expectations. Figure 4 shows
the impulse response functions when a one-time sunspot shock hits the economy. The shock
raises the default rate on impact by one percentage point after which default falls back
but remains persistently slightly above the steady-state level. An important consequence of
24
Figure 4: Impulse Responses for a One Time Sunspot Shock
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sunspot shocks is that the leverage ratio falls persistently, because credit market valuations
(default incentives) remain persistently low (high) from time zero onward. Lenders, who
take these incentives into account, tighten the credit constraints and charge (slightly) higher
interest rates.23 After the sunspot shock, the persistent response of all variables is the key
to sustain a self-fulfilling credit cycle. In fact, if the deterioration of credit conditions was
rather short-lived, the value of credit market access does not fall much, which implies that
default rates can go up only little today. That is, sizable responses of default rates require
a persistent credit market response.
Productive firms as borrowers are hurt by this disturbance in the credit market. Because
23Since the leverage ratio is much lower than the steady-state level, the recovery rate per unit of lending
rises. Through tightening credit constraints, lenders are able to recover a greater share of their exposure
after a default.
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of the fall of leverage, these firms use a smaller share of the aggregate capital stock which
dampens aggregate productivity. Therefore, we observe an endogenous fall of TFP which
results in a 0.22 percentage-point reduction of the output growth rate, followed by another
reduction of 0.28 percentage points in the next year. The real interest rate rises because of
the rise of the profit rate Π in order to induce low-productivity firms to save in the capital
market. The profit rate goes up because of the fall in aggregate labor demand which reduces
the wage rate below the steady-state level.
By comparison, we plot impulse response functions after all three fundamental shocks in
Figure 5. A one standard-deviation (negative) collateral shock lowers the collateral value,
so that lenders tighten credit on impact and charge a (slightly) higher interest rates to com-
pensate for the losses. But the fall in leverage only lasts for two years, as the autocorrelation
of λ is rather small. Since the fall in collateral value also raises the sunspot εt, we see a 0.8
percentage-point spike of the default rate. In expecting higher leverage in the future, firms
have less incentive to default, and this is why the default rate falls (about -0.1 percentage
points below the steady-state value) immediately after the initial rise.
In response to a rise in intermediation costs, the credit spread increases significantly
(60 basis points) and it raises the default rate (0.35 percentage points). Since the rise of
credit spreads further reduces the recovery parameter, leverage and output dynamics are
similar to those after a collateral shock. One should notice that the credit-market response
of the intermediation shock is mostly driven by the impact of the shock on the recovery
parameter λt and on the sunspot εt. Consistent with Gilchrist and Zakrajˇsek (2012), the
credit-spread shock induces a (rather short-lived) fall of output growth, while the default
rate barely moves. This is because the modest fall of leverage offsets the negative impact on
default incentives.
Finally, a negative productivity shock generates a persistent fall of output growth, partly
because the process of productivity is persistent, but also because it slightly pushes up the
sunspot εt. Recall that a sunspot shock persistently reduces output growth, as shown in
Figure 4 and it induces a rise of the recovery rate. Compared to a pure sunspot shock,
aggregate productivity reduces output directly, and this is why we see a rise of leverage and
of the debt-to-output ratio after the initial productivity shock. Together with the fall of
productivity, the risk-free rate falls since the profit rate Πt goes down.
Variance Decomposition
Next we look at how much the variation in the data can be separately explained by the
three financial shocks and aggregate productivity shocks. Then, we illustrate the channels
through which these shocks operate: self-fulfilling credit market expectations, on the one
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Figure 5: Impulse Responses after Adverse Fundamental Shocks
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 Intermediation Shocks
Collateral Shocks
Productivity Shocks
hand, or fundamental variables, on the other hand. This exercise is non-trivial because all
fundamental shocks affect fundamental variables and credit-market expectations at the same
time.
Evidently, from Table 4 the dynamics of recovery rates is mainly explained by collateral
shocks (49.53%) and intermediation shocks (32.07%). Collateral shocks directly affect the
recovery ability, while intermediation shocks affect both spreads and the recovery ability.
The variations of default rates are mainly explained by financial shocks, including direct
sunspot shocks (49.65%), collateral shocks (40.02%), and intermediation shocks (8.79%).
Credit spread fluctuations are mostly explained by intermediation shocks which take a direct
impact on spreads. It follows from our model that shocks to aggregate productivity do not
play an important role for spreads, default rates and recovery rates. The VAR results of
Section 2 suggest that this is a reasonable approximation.
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Table 4: Variance Decomposition in Percents
Exogenous Shocks to
Intermediation Productivity Collateral Sunspot All financial shocks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) + (3) + (4)
Credit Spreads 98.95 0.18 0.24 0.63 99.82
Recovery Rate 32.07 10.72 49.53 7.68 89.28
Default Rate 8.79 1.54 40.02 49.65 98.46
Output Growth 19.31 50.47 22.67 7.55 49.52
Debt Growth 30.08 4.77 62.73 2.42 95.23
TFP Growth 4.74 87.00 7.97 0.28 13.00
Regarding output growth, sunspot shocks can explain 7.6% of the variation, while in-
termediation shocks and collateral shocks explain 19.31% and 22.67%. Financial shocks
together contribute to almost 50% of output variations because they affect the credit flow
to productive firms.
There are two ways how the credit flow impacts output dynamics. On the one hand, the
credit flow affects the capital allocation among productive and unproductive firms. This is
the productivity effect of credit. On the other hand, the credit flow also affects the firms’
aggregate demand for capital and labor, and therefore aggregate production. This is the
factor effect of the credit flow.
To shed light on these two effects, we show how the variation of debt growth and TFP
growth in the model can be explained by each shock in the last two rows of Table 4. En-
dogenous fluctuation of productivity growth due to the credit allocation is about 13%, which
is much less important than the exogenous fluctuations in productivity growth (87%). Be-
cause credit is mostly driven by financial shocks, credit does not generate large endogenous
variation in TFP growth. Therefore, the main transmission mechanism of financial shocks
is through the effect on the firms’ factor demands.
While the previous discussion focuses on the decomposition into exogenous shocks, we
show now how these shocks impact credit market and macroeconomic variables through
fundamental channels and the sunspot channel separately. This decomposition is impor-
tant since we allow exogenous fundamental shocks (to collateral, intermediation costs or
productivity) to affect the sunspot variable εt.
We use a simple R-square statistics for this exercise. To see this, let ξt = [ξ
Φ
t , ξ
A
t , ξ
λ
t , ξ
ε
t ]
′ be
the collection of structural shocks. Then, the sunspot variable can be expressed as εt = cξt,
where c = [hΦε , h
A
ε , h
λ
ε , 1]. If we are interested in, for example, the output growth gt, we run
a population regression gt = β
εεt + νt, where νt is orthogonal to εt. Then, the variation in
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output growth explained by the sunspot channel can be expressed as the R-square of this
regression.24 For other variables of interests, we simply repeat this procedure.
Table 5: Variance Decomposition in Percents: Fundamentals versus Sunspots
Shocks that change
Fundamentals Sunspots
Credit Spreads 97.22 3.78
Recovery Rate 77.77 22.23
Default Rate 6.78 93.22
Output Growth 78.90 21.10
Debt Growth 59.70 40.30
TFP Growth 90.87 9.13
Table 5 shows that shocks that affect sunspots εt explain 21.1% of output growth vari-
ations. The transmission mechanism can be seen again from a rather small effect on pro-
ductivity growth (9.13% of TFP growth variation is explained by the sunspot channel), so
that the sunspot channel operates mainly through factor demands. The sunspot channel is
particularly important for the dynamics of default rates, and it also matters for variation of
recovery rates, but it plays almost no role for fluctuations of credit spreads.
Some Supporting Evidence for Sunspots
As we have seen, the variation in default rates is mainly caused by changes in beliefs in credit
market conditions, which affects the credit flow and aggregate real activity. We find some
supporting evidence showing that our estimated sunspot variable is indeed closely linked
with changes in expected credit market conditions.
There is a monthly survey conducted for small business firms which is called Small Busi-
ness Economic Trends (SBET). It is a monthly assessment of the U.S. small-business economy
and its near-term prospects since January 1986. Its data are collected through mail surveys
to random samples of the National Federal of Independent Business (NFIB) membership.
NFIB is the largest small-business trade association in the country with members scattered
across every state and every industry group. Despite the organization-based sampling frame,
the SBET has been shown to be a reliable gauge of small business economic activity over
the past decades, and its results regularly appear in mass media.
24That is, R2 = V ar(β
εεt)
V ar(gt)
, where βε = Cov(gt,εt)V ar(εt) . Therefore, the variance of gt explained by the sunspot
channel is simply the square of the correlation between gt and εt, i.e., R
2 = (Corr(gt, εt))
2.
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Figure 6: Sunspots and Credit Market Expectations. Note: Sunspots are estimated
from the model. The original survey measure (from Small Business Economic Trends, SBET) is
the percent of respondents who think that credit conditions will be “easier” minus those who think
credit conditions will be “harder”. We multiply the original survey measure by -1 and plot the
changes from the mean in standard deviations.
The survey contains a category called “expected credit conditions”, measured by the
percent of respondents who think that credit conditions will be “easier” minus those who
think credit conditions will be “harder”. When the measure falls, more respondents expect
the credit condition to be tougher and therefore the excess value of credit market access
should be lower.
We link the variation of this measure to the sunspots as identified by our model. The
SBET report suggests that an important reason for borrowing is to pay wages in advance.
For this reason, and to remove the more noisy responses of the smallest businesses, we focus
on the sample of firms with at least 39 employees (which is the group of largest firms in the
sample). We then choose the lowest monthly observation within each year as the observation
for that year in order to detect possible sudden belief variations. Since the observation is
always negative (that is, there are always fewer respondents who think that credit conditions
will be easier than those who think the opposite), we multiply this measure by -1 and we
plot the transformed measure after demeaning against the estimated sunspots in Figure 6.
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One can see that the transformed measure closely moves with the estimated sunspot
variable of our model. The correlation between the two series is 0.66, indicating a strong co-
movement. Although this survey is not representative for the U.S. business sector, sunspots
seem to reflect well the changes in credit market expectations as captured by survey data.
6 Conclusions
We develop a theory of firm default that is susceptible to changes in self-fulfilling beliefs.
Variations in credit market expectations affect incentives to default and thereby take an
impact on credit spreads and leverage. In turn, credit market conditions react to changes in
default rates and interest rates, and this dynamic relationship generates multiple equilibria
and the possibility of belief-driven cycles.
We use this idea in a tractable macroeconomic model which we calibrate so as to match
selected long-run credit market features for the U.S. economy in order to explore the re-
spective roles of shocks to credit expectations (sunspots), recovery rates, credit spreads, and
factor productivity.
Our findings suggest that default cycles, arising mostly from self-fulfilling beliefs, are an
important source for output growth variations. Compared to direct financial shocks that
affect the recovery ability or risk premia, one-time sunspot shocks can generate a persistent
credit cycle and prolonged reductions of output growth.
Besides non-fundamental shocks, our estimation shows that shocks to the recovery ability
can significantly affect credit market expectations, while shocks to spreads and productivity
play a lesser role. Since recovery ability is affected by market liquidity, one interesting
future research question is to understand how beliefs in financial market are tied to the asset
liquidity. Government policies that stabilize market liquidity may also anchor beliefs.
On the theoretical side, an interesting avenue for further research is the examination of
long-term debt for the impact of self-fulfilling beliefs on default rates. One may conjecture
that strategic default incentives are less sensitive to market expectations when borrowers
hold long-term debt. On the other hand, the ability of firms to role over long-term debt may
react to investors’ sentiments, as is known from the literature on sovereign debt cited in the
introduction.
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Appendix A: Proofs and Derivations
Proof of Proposition 1: To characterize the optimal contract (R, b), note first that,
conditional on an interest rate and on a default regime, the firm’s utility is increasing in
b. Hence, b should be as large as possible within a default regime, so that only one of the
following three contracts can be optimal:
1. No credit: b = 0 with utility U0(s) = log(Πs).
2. Partial default: R = R¯/(1 − p), debt is at the largest level that prevents default in
state η = ∆, which is bD(s) = Π(1−p)(1−e
−v−∆)
R¯−Π(1−p)(1−e−v−∆) · s. Utility is
UD(s) = log
( ΠsR¯
R¯− Π(1− p)(1− e−v−∆)
)
− (1− p)∆ .
3. No default: R = R¯, debt is at the largest level that prevents default for both states
η = 0,∆, which is bN(s) = Π(1−e
−v)
R¯−Π(1−e−v) · s. Utility is
UN(s) = log
( ΠsR¯
R¯− Π(1− e−v)
)
.
Observe first that the level of savings s is irrelevant for the choice among these three contracts.
Next, because of UN(s) ≥ U0(s) for all v ≥ 0 (with strict inequality for v > 0), option 1 (no
credit) can be ruled out (for any v > 0).
No default dominates partial default if UN(s) ≥ UD(s) which is equivalent to
v ≥ v¯ = log
( Πe−∆(p+ ep∆ − 1)
(Π− R¯)e−(1−p)∆ + R¯− Π(1− p)
)
.
v¯ is well-defined because the expression in the log(.) is positive: the denominator is positive
if (Π− R¯)e−(1−p)∆ > Π(1− p)− R¯. The latter condition follows from the first inequality in
(3). Moreover, the first inequality in (3) is equivalent to v¯ < vmax = log(Π/(Π− R¯)). Hence,
no default is the optimal contract for all v ∈ [v¯, vmax).
The second inequality in condition (3) is equivalent to v¯ > 0. Because UD(s) > UN(s) is
equivalent to v < v¯, the partial default contract is optimal for all v ∈ [0, v¯). 
Proof of Proposition 2: Substituting V (ω) = log(ω) +V , V d(ω) = log(ω) +V d, and U(s)
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from Proposition 1 into Bellman equations (1) and (2) yields
log(ω) + V = max
s
(1− β) log(ω − s) + β[log(Πs) + V d]
+ βmax
{
log
[ R¯
R¯− Π(1− e−v)
]
, log
[ R¯
R¯− Π(1− p)(1− e−v−∆)
]
− (1− p)∆
}
,
log(ω) + V d = max
s
(1− β) log(ω − s) + β[log(Πs) + V d] .
This shows that the savings policy s = βω is optimal for both types of firms and that the
terms log(ω) cancel out on both sides of these Bellman equations, leaving the constant terms
V and V d to be determined from
V = (1− β) log(1− β) + β[log(βΠ) + V d]
+ βmax
{
log
[ R¯
R¯− Π(1− e−v)
]
, log
[ R¯
R¯− Π(1− p)(1− e−v−∆)
]
− (1− p)∆
}
,
V d = (1− β) log(1− β) + β[log(βΠ) + V d] .
Differentiate the second from the first equation yields the fixed-point equation v = f(v) for
the value difference v = V − V d, as specified in the main text.
It is immediate from the definition of f and parameter condition (3) that f is well-defined
for v ∈ [0, vmax), that f(v) → ∞ for v → vmax, and that f is increasing and continuous.
Furthermore f(0) > 0 if and only if
R¯
R¯− Π(1− p)(1− e−∆) > e
(1−p)∆ ,
which is equivalent to the second inequality in (3) (which is in turn equivalent to v¯ > 0).
Then the claim of the proposition follows if f(v¯) < v¯ holds. This inequality is equivalent to
the one stated in (4). 
Proof of Proposition 3: We prove the existence of a sunspot cycle that alternates between
two sunspot states i = 1, 2 with transition probability pi. In this stochastic case we use the
timing convention that the sunspot state is realized after borrowers repay their debt (or not)
in the beginning of the period.25 The Bellman equation of a firm in sunspot state i is
Vi(ω) = max
s,(R,b)
(1− β) log(ω − s) + βEmax
{
Vˆi[Π(s+ b)−Rb], Vˆ di [Π(s+ b)]− η
}
,
25This timing is different from the one that we use in the macroeconomic model, but considerably simpler
to prove the existence of sunspot cycles in the partial model.
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where Vˆi(.) and Vˆ
d
i (.) respectively, are the continuation values before the realization of next
period’s sunspot state. With (common) transition probability pi we have
Vˆi(ω) = piV−i(ω) + (1− pi)Vi(ω) ,
Vˆ di (ω) = piV
d
−i(ω) + (1− pi)V di (ω) .
The utility value of a firm with a default history satisfies the recursion
V di (ω) = max
s
(1− β) log(ω − s) + βVˆ di (Πs) .
As in the deterministic case, all firms save s = βω and value functions take the forms
Vi(ω) = log(ω) + Vi, V
d
i (ω) = log(ω) + V
d
i , where Vi and V
d
i are independent of net worth.
Write vi ≡ Vi − V di for the surplus value of access to credit (expected credit conditions),
and vˆi = piv−i + (1 − pi)vi for expected credit conditions before realization of the sunspot
state when i is last period’s state. Rewrite the firm’s value in state i as Vi(ω) = maxs(1 −
β) log(ω − s) + β[Vˆ di + Ui(s)] where Ui(s) is the surplus value of the optimal credit contract
for a firm with savings s in state i:
Ui(s) ≡ max
(R,b)
Emax
{
log[Π(s+ b)−Rb] + vˆi, log[Π(s+ b)]− η
}
s.t.
R¯b = E(Rb) =

Rb if log[Π(s+ b)−Rb] + vˆi ≥ log[Π(s+ b)] ,
(1− p)Rb if log[Π(s+ b)] > log[Π(s+ b)−Rb] + vˆi ≥ log[Π(s+ b)]−∆ ,
0 else.
It is immediate to see that this problem is the same as in the deterministic case, with vˆi
replacing the stationary value v. Hence Proposition 1 applies:
1. If vˆi > v¯, the optimal credit contract has no default and surplus value Ui(s) =
log
[
R¯Πs
R¯−Π(1−e−vˆi )
]
.
2. If vˆi < v¯, the optimal credit contract has positive default with surplus value Ui(s) =
log
[
R¯Πs
R¯−Π(1−p)(1−e−vˆi−∆)
]
− (1− p)∆.
From the Bellman equations for Vi and V
d
i , it follows that expected credit conditions vi =
Vi − V di satisfy the system of equations
vi = f(vˆi) = f(piv−i + (1− pi)vi) , i = 1, 2 ,
where f(.) is defined as in the main text. We can write this system of equations in the
form φ(v1, v2, pi) = 0, where φ : R3 → R2, and φi(v1, v2, pi) ≡ f(piv−i + (1 − pi)vi) − vi
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for i = 1, 2. Under the requirement of Proposition 2, this equation system has the solution
φ(vD, vN , 0) = 0 since both vD and vN are stationary equilibria. Moreover, φ is differentiable
at (vD, vN , 0). Therefore, we can invoke the implicit function theorem to prove the existence
of non-degenerate (i.e., stochastic) cycles for positive transition probabilities pi > 0 such that
v1 is sufficiently close to v
D (so that the default rate is positive in state i = 1) and v2 is close
to vN (so that the default rate is zero in state i = 2). The Jacobian matrix of φ with respect
to (v1, v2) evaluated at (v
D, vN , 0) is(
dφ1
dv1
(vD, vN , 0) dφ1
dv2
(vD, vN , 0)
dφ2
dv1
(vD, vN , 0) dφ2
dv2
(vD, vN , 0)
)
=
(
f ′(vD)− 1 0
0 f ′(vN)− 1
)
.
Because of f ′(vD) < 1 < f ′(vN) (see Figure 2), this matrix has full rank. By the implicit
function theorem, there exists a solution vi(pi), i = 1, 2, for pi > 0 such that v1(0) = v
D,
v2(0) = v
N . This proves the existence of two-state sunspot cycles. 
Derivation of the capital return Πt
For a firm with capital k, the first-order condition for hiring labor is
(1− α)A
(
zk
At`
)α
= wt .
Therefore, labor demand is
` = zk
[
(1− α)A1−αt
wt
]1/α
,
and net worth before interest expense (or interest income) is[
α
[
(1− α)At
wt
] 1−α
α
+ 1− δ
]
zk ≡ Πtzk .
Proof of Proposition 4: The contract (θ, ρ), together with state-specific default thresholds
(η˜′), maximizes
Et
{
(1−G(η˜′)) log[1 + θ(1− ρ)] +
∫ η˜′
−∞
log[(1 + θ)(1− λt)ζ]− η − vt+1 dG(η)
}
,
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subject to (7) and (8). Substitution of 1 + θ(1− ρ) via (7) gives the objective function
Et
{
log ((1 + θ)(1− λt)ζ)− η˜′(1−G(η˜′))−
∫ η˜′
−∞
η dG(η)− vt+1
}
.
The additive terms log((1− λt)ζ) and −Etvt+1 are irrelevant for the maximization. Solving
(8) for 1 + θ, using ρ = ξ(1 + θ)/θ, gives
1 + θ =
ρ¯t(1 + Φt)
ρ¯t(1 + Φt)−Ψ(ξ) ,
with
Ψ(ξ) ≡ Et
{
λtG(η˜(ξ)) + ξ(1−G(η˜(ξ)))
}
,
and
η˜(ξ) = log
[(1− λt)ζ
1− ξ
]
− vt+1 ,
which is the ex-post default threshold. Substitution into the objective function yields a
maximization problem in ξ:
max
ξ
− log(ρ¯t(1 + Φt)−Ψ(ξ))− Et
{
η˜(ξ)(1−G(η˜(ξ))) +
∫ η˜(ξ)
−∞
η dG(η)
}
.
The first-order condition for this problem is
Ψ′(ξ)
ρ¯t(1 + Φt)−Ψ(ξ) =
1
1− ξEt(1−G(η˜(ξ))) . (17)
Then, using the derivative η˜′(ξ) = 1/(1− ξ):
Ψ′(ξ) = Et(1−G(η˜(ξ))) + 1
1− ξEt[G
′(η˜(ξ))(λt − ξ)] .
Substituting this expression into the first-order condition (17) yields (11) in the proposition.
Furthermore, the default threshold (9) follows directly from (7), and θt = ρ¯t(1 + Φt)/(ρ¯t(1 +
Φt)−Ψ(ξt))− 1, which leads to (10). 
Derivation of equation (12)
Recall that V (ω;Xt) and V
d(ω;Xt) are values of firms with (without) a clean credit
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record whose net worth is ω in period t. Therefore
V (ω;Xt) = piVˆb(ω;Xt) + (1− pi)Vˆl(ω;Xt) ,
V d(ω;Xt) = piVˆ
d
b (ω;Xt) + (1− pi)Vˆ dl (ω;Xt) ,
where Vˆ
(d)
τ (ω;Xt), τ = b, l, are values of borrowing and lending firms after realization of
idiosyncratic capital productivities. These satisfy the Bellman equations
Vˆb(ω;Xt) = max
s
(1− β) log(ω − s)
+ βEt max
{
V ([1 + θt(1− ρt)]zHΠts;Xt+1), V d((1 + θt)(1− λt)ζzHΠts;Xt+1)− η′
}
,
Vˆl(ω;Xt) = max
s
(1− β) log(ω − s) + βEtV (R¯ts;Xt+1) ,
Vˆ db (ω;Xt) = max
s
(1− β) log(ω − s) + β(1− ψ)EtV d(zHΠts;Xt+1) + βψEtV (zHΠts;Xt+1) ,
Vˆ dl (ω;Xt) = max
s
(1− β) log(ω − s) + β(1− ψ)EtV d(R¯ts;Xt+1) + βψEtV (R¯ts;Xt+1) .
Expectation operators are over the realizations of aggregate states and of the idiosyncratic
default loss η′ in period t+ 1.
It is straightforward to verify that all value functions take the form Vˆ
(d)
τ (ω;Xt) = log(ω)+
Vˆ
(d)
τ (Xt) for τ = b, l, V
(d)(ω′;Xt) = log(ω′) + V (d)(Xt), and that savings are s = βω. With
B ≡ (1− β) log(1− β) + β log(β), it follows
Vˆb(Xt) =B + βEt max
{
log([1 + θt(1− ρt)]zHΠt) + V (Xt+1), (18)
log((1 + θt)(1− λt)ζzHΠt) + V d(Xt+1)− η′
}
,
Vˆl(Xt) =B + β log R¯t + βEtV (Xt+1) , (19)
Vˆ db (Xt) =B + β log(z
HΠt) + β(1− ψ)EtV d(Xt+1) + βψEtV (Xt+1) , (20)
Vˆ dl (Xt) =B + β log R¯t + β(1− ψ)EtV d(Xt+1) + βψEtV (Xt+1) . (21)
Moreover,
V (Xt) = piVˆb(Xt) + (1− pi)Vˆl(Xt) , (22)
V d(Xt) = piVˆ
d
b (Xt) + (1− pi)Vˆ dl (Xt) . (23)
Define vt = V (Xt)− V d(Xt), take the difference between (22) and (23) and use (18)–(21) to
40
obtain
vt =pi
{
Vˆb(Xt)− Vˆ db (Xt)
}
+ (1− pi)
{
Vˆl(Xt)− Vˆ dl (Xt)
}
=βpiEt
{
(1− ψ)vt+1 + max
{
log[1 + θt(1− ρt)], log[(1 + θt)(1− λt)ζ]− η′ − vt+1
}}
+ β(1− pi)(1− ψ)Etvt+1
=βpiEt max
{
log[1 + θt(1− ρt)], log[(1 + θt)(1− λt)ζ]− η′ − vt+1
}
+ β(1− ψ)Etvt+1 .
Using the default threshold η˜t+1, the max{.} term is equal to
log
[
(1 + θt)(1− λt)ζ
]− vt+1 + Et max{−η˜t+1,−η′} .
This proves equation (12).
Appendix B: Miscellaneous
Collection of Equilibrium Conditions
We list all equilibrium conditions used for numerical exercises. There are 10 equations and
we have 10 unknowns (η˜t, θt, ρt, ρ¯t, vt, Πt, wt, Ωt+1, ft+1, ξt)
η˜t = log
[1− λt
1− ξt
]
− Et [vt+1] + log ζ
θt =
ρ¯t(1 + Φt)
ρ¯t(1 + Φt)− Et [λtG(η˜t+1) + ξt(1−G(η˜t+1))] − 1
EtG′(η˜t+1)(ξt − λt)] = Et(1−G(η˜t+1))
{
1− ρ¯t(1 + Φt)− EtG(η˜t+1)(ξt − λt)]
}
vt = βpiEt
{
log(1+θt)+log(1−λt)+log ζ−µ−(η˜t+1−µ)(1−G(η˜t+1)+σ2G′(η˜t+1)
}
+β(1−ψ−pi)Etvt+1
ξt = ρtθt/(1 + θt)[
Πt − (1− δ)
α
] α
α−1
=
(
κ
1− α
) α
α+ν
[
β
Ωt
At
(
zL
[
(1− pi)− piftθt
]
+ zHpi
[
ft(1 + θt) + 1− ft
])] ανα+ν
Ωt+1 = βz
HΠtΩt
{
(1−pi)ρ¯t+pift
[
(1−G(η˜t+1))(1+θt(1−ρt))+ζG(η˜t+1)(1+θt)(1−λt)
]
+pi(1−ft)
}
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ft+1 =
ft
[
(1− pi)ρ¯t + pi(1−G(η˜t+1))(1 + θt(1− ρt))
]
+ (1− ft)ψ[(1− pi)ρ¯t + pi]
(1− pi)ρ¯t + pift
[
(1−G(η˜t+1))(1 + θt(1− ρt)) + ζG(η˜t+1)(1 + θt)(1− λt)
]
+ pi(1− ft)
with γ ≤ ρ¯t and ftpiθt ≤ (1− pi) satisfied.
In a deterministic steady state, the first four equations can be solved separately. To see
this, one can first solve
ξ(η˜) = λ+
1−G
G′ +G(1−G) (1− ρ¯)
θ(η˜) =
ρ¯(1 + Φ)
ρ¯(1 + Φ)− λ− (1−G)2
G′+G(1−G) [1− ρ¯]
− 1
v(η˜) = −η˜ + log (1− λ)− log(1− ξ) + log ζ
Then, one solves η˜ from
1− β(1− ψ − pi)
βpi
Ev(η˜) = log(1+θ(η˜))+log ζ+log(1−λ)−µ−(η˜−µ) [1− EG(η˜)]+σ2EG′(η˜)
Output and Productivity
Given an equilibrium, we can describe the dynamics of aggregate variables. Aggregate output
is simply
Yt = (At`t)
1−α(z˜tKt)α , (24)
with average capital productivity
z˜t = piz
H + (1− pi)zL + ftpiθt[zH − zL] .
Define total factor productivity (TFP) as the residual of the aggregate production func-
tion, i.e.,
A˜t =
Yt
Kαt `
1−α
t
= A1−αt z˜
α
t .
Three things affect capital efficiency z˜t of this economy. First, a greater share of firms with
access to the credit market leads to a more efficient capital allocation. Second, the higher the
ability to raise external capital θt, the more capital is employed by productive firms. Third,
lower intermediation costs Φt imply that less capital is eventually used at high-productivity
firms.
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Consumption and investment
Splitting output into consumption and investment must take our timing convention into
account. This is because firm owners consume out of their net worth at the beginning of the
period, while workers are paid out of current production within the period. Conceptually
consumption should be measured based on actual output, so this is why consumption in
period t should be measured
Ct = (1− α)Yt + (1− β)Ωt+1 ,
where Ωt+1 is net worth at the end of period t (beginning of period t+ 1). Gross investment
in period t is
It = [Kt+1 −Kt] + [1− (1− δ)z˜t]Kt ,
where the first part is net investment which equals βΩt+1 − Kt and the second part is
depreciation. The latter takes into account that capital depreciates differently in high- or
low-productivity firms since z shocks affect the stock of capital. Adding up consumption
and investment, using gives Ct+ It = Ωt+1− (1− δ)z˜tKt+ (1−α)Yt. We can write net worth
in period t+ 1 as
Ωt+1 = ΠtKtz˜t + Trt+1 ,
where
Trt+1 = ΠtKtpiftz
H
{
θtρ¯t(1 + Φt)− (1−G(η˜t+1))ρtθt −G(η˜t+1)λt(1 + θt)
}
are net transfers from foreign insurance companies (i.e. payments from abroad to cover bank
losses or payments of domestic banks to insurance firms if there are bank profits) which are
identical to net imports. Because of ΠtKtz˜t = αYt + (1− δ)z˜tKt,
Ct + It = Yt + Trt+1 .
In words, consumption and investment equals domestic output plus net imports.
Calibration details
From the capital–output ratio K/Y = 2, we obtain Π = 1− δ + α Y
z˜K
= 1− δ + α Y
K
= 1.07.
We target the default rate G = G(η˜) = 0.0172 and the recovery rate r = 0.4215. Because
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of r = λ/ξ = λ(1 + θ)/(θρ), we have
γ(1 + Φ) = (1−G)ρ+Gλ(1 + θ)/θ = (1−G)ρ+Grρ ,
which implies the interest spread (note ρ¯ = γ):
∆ =
ρ
γ
=
1 + Φ
1−G+Gr .
Given that the spread in the data is ∆ = 1.019956, we calibrate Φ = 0.0099.
The targets for the debt-output ratio B/Y = 0.82, the leverage ratio in constrained firms
θ = 2.85, the default rate 1.72%, the recovery rate 42.15%, together with the capital-output
ratio K/Y = 2, identify the five parameters β, µ, σ, λ and γ = zL/zH , as we show now.
The steady-state value of f (share of firms with credit market access) follows from piθf =
B
K
= B
Y
· Y
K
= 0.41, hence f = 0.41/(piθ) = 0.9655. From the steady-state equation for f , we
have the quadratic equation
af 2 + bf + c = 0
where a = piθ(1− ρ) + piG[θρ− (1 + θ) [1− ζ(1− λ)]] > 0, b = pi− pi(1−G) [1 + θ(1− ρ)] +
ψ[(1− pi)ρ¯+ pi], and c = −ψ[(1− pi)ρ¯+ pi] < 0. From the normalization z˜ = 1, we have
zH =
1
pi + (1− pi)γ + fpiθ(1− γ) .
Use this equation, ρ = ∆γ, λ = rξ = rθρ
1+θ
, and the numbers for f , θ, ψ, pi, to solve uniquely
for
γ = ρ¯ =
[piθ − piG(1 + θ)(1− ζ)] f 2 + pi [1− (1−G)(1 + θ)] f − ψpi(1− f)
ψ(1− pi)(1− f) + piθ∆(1−G)f(f − 1) + ζpiθGr∆f 2 = 0.7458
and therefore
λ = rξ =
rθρ
1 + θ
=
rθγ(1 + Φ)
(1 + θ)(1−G+Gr) = 0.2374 .
From stationarity of Ωt/At follows
eµA = βzHΠ
{
(1− pi)γ + pif
[
(1−G) [1 + θ(1− ρ)] + ζG(1 + θ)(1− λ)
]
+ pi(1− f)
}
and hence β = 0.9420 (i.e. β is identified from the K/Y ratio).
Now µ and σ are implied from G(η˜) (default rate) and G′(η˜), where η˜ is the steady-state
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default threshold. To see this, use the default threshold condition:
D ≡ η˜ + v − log ζ = log(1− λ)− log(1− ξ) = 0.5571.
Then, the first-order condition for the optimal contract implies
G′ = G′(η˜) =
[1− γ(1 + Φ)] (1−G)
(1− λ)(1− e−D) −G+G
2 = 0.7279.
The steady-state condition for v is
1 + βpi − β(1− ψ)
βpi
v = log(1− λ) + log(1 + θ) + log ζ − µ− (η˜ − µ)(1−G) + σ2G′ .
Use η˜ = D− v+ log ζ to solve this equation for v, which yields η˜(µ, σ) = D− v(µ, σ). Then
the numbers for G and G′ yield µ = 0.0383 and σ = 0.0584 (numeric solution).
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